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Hungary is holding parliamentary elections on 8th April. While the systemic deficiencies of
the Hungarian electoral system have received international attention, e.g. how redistricting
and the party dominance in the media favours Fidesz, other elements have received less
coverage. Here we assess two key components regarding minorities: the representation of
national minorities in Hungary and of Hungarians living in neighbouring states. These
aspects help us reveal the operative logic and manipulative strategy of the Hungarian
illiberal regime. We argue that the present Hungarian regulation and the practice of minority
and extraterritorial citizen voting create several possibilities for abuse. Hidden behind the
façade of multiparty elections, nation building and minority rights, the current system serves
as an instrument to keep the government in power.
Votes of the Hungarian kin minorities
In 2010, the Hungarian Parliament amended the Act on Hungarian Citizenship and
introduced a new naturalization procedure for ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary’s
borders. About 2.2 million persons of Hungarian ethnicity live in neighbouring countries. In
accordance with its internal political interest, the Fidesz-KDNP party alliance grants voting
rights to ethnic Hungarian extraterritorial citizens: due to their number, they can significantly
alter the outcome of parliamentary elections in Hungary. The governmental aim to confer
one million citizenships through the simplified naturalisation procedure was reached by
December 2017.
According to the electoral law in Hungary, everyone – except citizens without permanent
residency (extraterritorial citizens) – can vote both for the party or national minority lists and
for individual candidates. Of the 199 seats in parliament, 106 individual candidates come
from single member districts, and the remaining 93 seats are filled by the party and minority
lists.  Extraterritorial citizens, however, have only one of these two votes, i.e. they cannot
vote for individual candidates in single member districts, but only for the party lists.
Therefore, Hungarian nationals’ votes count twice as much as the votes of Hungarians
living outside the borders, which violates the “one person, one vote” principle[2] and that of
all votes carrying equal weight.
As Scheppele states, in the Hungarian electoral system only extraterritorial citizens have
the possibility to vote ”either by mail or by having a proxy drop their ballot at a designated
polling station without the voter herself having to appear in person.”  Voters with
permanent residency in Hungary (such as Hungarian emigrants), who are abroad at the
time of the elections, can, however, only cast their votes at the embassies and consulates,
which may be hundreds of kilometres away from their location, which requires enormous
costs and time. Their exact number is not known. However, it is estimated that their number
[3]
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is at least around 500,000.[4] Expats whose departure was at least partly due to the
worsening conditions in the past years, eight of which under Fidesz rule, are most unlikely
to vote for Fidesz.
The votes of Hungarian kin minorities are not handled separately in the party lists from the
votes of resident Hungarian citizens; as a result, it is not known which member of
parliament is elected with the votes of non-resident citizens, or who represents ethnic
Hungarians living abroad. What is more, it is difficult to check the fairness of elections on
another state’s the territory. This is why, at the time of the 2014 elections international
observers (e.g. the OSCE/ODIHR has deployed a Limited Election Observation Mission)
concentrated their activity on the territory of Hungary.
In the 2014 elections, when Fidesz-KDNP gained two thirds of the seats, 95.5 percent of
voters beyond the borders voted for the party alliance, while only 43.5 percent in Hungary.
The votes of non-resident citizens were needed for the two thirds majority of Fidesz-KDNP
(193,793 non-resident citizens registered on the voters’ list, and 128,712 voted). This is in
line with those extraterritorial citizens’ well-documented feeling of honour who received
their citizenship from Fidesz, or Orbán himself.  But there is more to it.
Just like in other areas of the governing party alliance’s campaigning, there is considerable
confusion about the role of the state and the party, resulting in the public financing of
electoral mobilization. In Romania, the country with the largest Hungarian community, at
the time of the 2014 elections the civic organisation the “Hungarian National Council of
Transylvania” (financed by the Hungarian government) helped handle citizenship
applications and later assisted in delivering the external votes together with the Hungarian
People’s Party of Transylvania (Romania), both of which are political alliances of Fidesz.
They delivered almost two thirds of the Romanian votes.   The Hungarian HVG periodical
published photos of the 2014 elections, showing extraterritorial citizens voting in Romania
in open pavilions while others were assisting them in filling the ballot paper. The National
Council helped with more than 190,000 people’s citizenship application in Transylvania,
registering some 85-90,000 people preceding the elections in 2014, and collecting
approximately 66,000 ballots.
Since then, the Hungarian government has extended its influence in Transylvania by an
agreement with the largest Hungarian political party in Romania, RMDSZ. Based on the
agreement, an RMDSZ-linked civic organisation, the Eurotrans Foundation provides
considerable help with citizenship applications and takes a major part in the registration and
ballot collection process. Preceding the elections, a new website was created to support
the registration, which corresponds to the Hungarian informational campaign, organized by
Fidesz. The structure and the colours of the website recall the same style as the website of
the national consultation. (National consultations are rounds of highly manipulative
questionnaires combined with political campaigns, e.g. the anti-Soros campaign of the
Hungarian government.)
The goal of mobilization is served by several rounds of government informational
campaigns. The national consultation letters are received by all the Hungarian citizens,
including extraterritorial citizens. Before the elections, extraterritorial citizens receive further




determine the faith of the Carpathian Basin. (The Carpathian Basin bordered Hungary
before the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920.) The first letters were sent out to Hungarians to
encourage them to apply for citizenship, promising that those who applied by August 2017
would receive their citizenship by the end of the same year. This was meant to ensure their
participation in the Hungarian elections. A new round of letters were circulated in
December, when the Prime Minister asked for active participation in the Hungarian
elections in April 2018. This mailshot cost Hungarian taxpayers more than 200 million
forints (640,000 euros).
The Hungarian government also started to colonize Hungarian-speaking media in the
neighbouring countries, financing online communication platforms. The organization
“Without Borders for the Hungarian Press Foundation” injected enormous amounts of
support into a small media platform. The Foundation receives two thirds of its funding from
the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister. This amount “in itself could buy up the entire
Hungarian language Transylvanian media”.
The Hungarian government’s influence is clearly visible in the case of the political parties
and the connected civic organizations. Furthermore, the systematic financing of clerical life
and the Hungarian language media in Transylvania is evident; all these actors are involved
in some way in campaigning for Fidesz or collecting Hungarian citizens’ ballots.
During the last elections, 65 of the 128,712 voting letters received were incorrectly filled,
and 167 ballots were invalid. The then president of the People’s Party Tibor T. Toró
expressed his hope that the National Electoral Office would systematically track the
problems with the invalid voting letters. He also confirmed that the voting packages that
were filled with the help of volunteers from the National Council and the People’s Party
were certainly correct. Furthermore, the President of the Cluj County People’s Party
announced that their volunteers had been involved in the finish of the Fidesz campaign in
Hungary.
Extraterritorial citizens could register 15 days ahead of the 2018 elections. By the end of
March, with these organizations’ help 186,288 registrations were received from Romania
alone. Extraterritorial citizens may cast their postal votes from March 26 to April 8. The
consulates are open for unusually long hours (from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. every weekday,
including religious holidays) so that they can assist the electorate. The offices of the
organizations listed above offer help with filling out the documents of casting postal voting.
The consideration behind allowing two weeks for postal voting is to ensure that the ballots
are received, but in the case of Transylvania, the organizations suggest not relying on the
Romanian post, so effectively the ballots are delivered by co-workers of the organization
and consulates.
Compared to this system, the situation of Hungarian citizens with residency in the country
who are abroad at the time of voting is highly controversial: they are allowed to cast their
vote only on the day of the elections, and only at embassies and consulates. These
difficulties have a clear impact on participation, as it is clearly visible from the low number
of registrations. By the end of March, only about 50,000 citizens registered with one of the
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foreign representations.  During the last elections, in London members of the largest
Hungarian community abroad had to stand for long hours in front of the dedicated polling
place. This year only about 8,000 people have registered to cast their ballots in London.
Altogether 462,550 registrations have been received, and to this day 378,416 citizens have
registered to vote by post this year. Registrations are still coming in, and processing is
continuous. In 2014, 88,088 votes resulted in one mandate on the party lists. We can
expect that the extraterritorial citizens will cast their vote again predominantly for Fidesz,
which in this case could result at least in three, or even as many as five more mandates,
depending on the final extraterritorial registrations and the final voter turnout at the 2018
elections.
Votes of the National Minorities
The Hungarian illiberal regime leaves intact the former minority self-government system
based on the principle of personal autonomy, but the illiberal system after 2010 created a
strong dependence system for minorities. National minorities represent a relatively small
percentage of the overall population of Hungary and are to a large degree linguistically and
culturally assimilated. For example, most minority self-governments use Hungarian as their
working language, and the campaign for the minority elections is mostly conducted in
Hungarian.
According to Article 2 (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, nationalities (i.e. national
minorities) living in Hungary shall participate in the work of parliament as defined by a
cardinal act. The new Act on Nationalities (i.e. Minority Act) and the Act on the Election of
the Members of Parliament introduced the parliamentary representation of national
minorities: all thirteen nationalities[7] recognized by the Minority Act can have
representation in parliament at the expense of votes on the national electoral list. If
someone votes for the minority list, they cannot vote for a party list. They can still cast their
vote for single-member district candidates, however. Under a preferential quota, one
minority mandate can be gained by one-quarter of the votes needed for ordinary mandates
of the electoral list.
At first glance, one can see these measures as strengthening minority political rights in
Hungary, but the regulation implies multiple possibilities for abuse with minority rights and
violates the ‘one person, one vote’ principle, that of each vote carrying equal weight, and
the competitive nature of the election.
Obtaining the preferential mandate seems impossible for most of the minorities considering
the low number of people belonging to each of them. In the 2014, elections none of the
recognized minorities reached the preferential quota. Therefore, according to the electoral
law, the first candidate of every list became a national minority spokesperson in parliament
– with no voting rights, calling into question whether this is indeed ‘representation’ as
guaranteed in Article 18 (1) of the Act. Although the largest minority in Hungary is the
Roma, the German minority had more registered voters in 2014. Yet, neither community
was able to reach the quota.
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Because registration as national-minority voter is based on self-identification, people
belonging to the majority can also decide to register and vote for minority lists. This
dysfunction effectively hinders the self-representation of minorities and has a long history in
nationality self-government elections in Hungary.[8] For instance, in 2002 the non Roma
citizens of Jászladány voted out the members of the Roma minority government who were
protesting against segregated education.[9]
Furthermore, minority lists are put together by the nationality self-governments, which are
dependent on the Hungarian government. The voter cannot influence the order or choose
between the candidates. As the preferential quota only applies to the first seat in
parliament, the minority voter’s only possibility is to vote or not to vote for the single fixed
list drawn up by the national self-government: only the first candidate has a chance to be a
MP. This makes the process less of a genuine election and more of a delegation cloaked in
the legitimacy of an election. At the same time, this makes it susceptible to be used as
instruments for retaining the power of the Fidesz-KDNP government, rather than truly
strengthening minority representation.
Over the past few months, the number of registered minority voters has increased. In 2014
there were 15,209 people, now this number has doubled, with more than 33,000 registered
as German minority voters. The list of the German minority, established by National
German Self-government (LDU) is led by Imre Ritter, who is now the minority
spokesperson. From 1994 he was a minority representative in the local self-government of
Budaörs, and in 2006 he became a local representative with the support of Fidesz-KDNP.
He lost the 2010 local elections as the Fidesz-KDNP candidate for mayor.
LDU decided in early 2017 to aim for a full mandate, as the spokesperson’s possibilities
were limited. Considering this intention and the (mostly Hungarian language) campaign for
an independent representative, we could think that LDU’s goal is not merely supporting
Fidesz. However, the candidate, (who is still a member of Fidesz) clearly stated that “he
does not want to play the role of the opposition in parliament” and except for minority
related issues, “he will vote loyally to the government”. According to the logic of the
Hungarian illiberal regime, for asserting interests, the representative will have to come
terms with the Fidesz-KDNP government anyway.
The numbers of registered Roma voters have also increased from 14,271 in 2014 to almost
20,000, with the number slightly falling before the deadline.
Félix Farkas, leader of the National Roma Self-government’s list is a member of Lungo
Drom, a Roma political party having worked in a regularly renewed electoral alliance with
Fidesz-KDNP since 2001. The president of Lungo Drom, Flórián Farkas (Fidesz MP) has
the 17th position on the Fidesz-KDNP party list, which means he will certainly be a member
of parliament. After the nomination of the party list it seemed not as important to fulfil the
preferential mandate.
Although the results are highly dependent on voters’ behaviour and turnout, this means that
the German minority list will certainly reach the preferential quota and there might be one
more FIDESZ-leaning politician as a German representative in parliament. The Roma
minority list also had this chance but perhaps the goal of fulfilling the mandate has been
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overwritten by other political motivations. (All of the other minorities have less than 2,200
registered voters, which will lead to wasting their votes, as it is impossible for them to reach
the preferential quota.)
We can see that the setup of the system could serve the governing party alliance, as
registration is manipulated by Fidesz interests, and both of the potential representatives are
connected to Fidesz. The preferential quota was 22,022 in 2014. With a similar participation
rate, in 2018 this means that at least one preferential mandate, the German one, will be
hijacked by Fidesz.
* * *
We have argued that the motivation behind the elements of Hungary’s current electoral law
described is not the alleged interests of ethnic Hungarians living abroad or the protection of
Hungarian national minorities but rather to gain votes for Fidesz without real representation
or democratic control. What is more, this type of the regulation and governmental policy
might increase the Hungarian population’s anti-minority sentiments.
The governmental control of extraterritorial citizen and minority votes is even more
apparent than in 2014, which will have a more significant impact on the results in the
upcoming elections. From the 93 mandates to be filled via party and minority lists, one MP
will probably be elected from a minority list and another three to five MPs might get seats
by the votes of extraterritorial citizens in the 2018 election. These mandates are expected
to join the ranks of the parliamentary group of the Fidesz-KDNP Party Alliance.
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